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CRIMINAL LAW
Escape from Prison • Defenses • Duress • Homosexual Attacks
People v. Harmon, 53 Mich. App. 482, 220 N.W.2d 212
The time has come when we can no longer close our eyes to the
growing problem of institutional gang rapes in our prison system.1
N RECENT YEARS, the courts have begun to recognize the critical problem
of homosexual attacks occurring in our prisons.2 However, prior to the
decision in People v. Harmon,3 one who escaped from prison for fear of
such homosexual attacks could not avail himself of the defense of duress
or coercion, in order to have the question submitted to the jury.
4
The defendant in Harmon was an 18-year-old male, who has been
sentenced to imprisonment in the Ionia, Michigan, penal institution.
Within a few days of his transfer to that prison's dormitory facilities, 5 the
defendant was approached by seven or eight inmates who demanded that
he have sex with them. When he refused, they beat and kicked him-
refusing to stop until another inmate happened to enter the room.6 It was
after a second similar assault that the defendant effectuated his escape.7
IPeople v. Harmon, 53 Mich. App. 482, 483, 220 N.W.2d 212, 213 (1974).
2 Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969), supplemented by, 309 F. Supp.
362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), affd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); People v. Richards, 269
Cal. App. 2d 768, 75 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1969); People v. Noble, 18 Mich. App. 300,
170 N.W.2d 916 (1969); State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. 1971) (en banc); see
also Inmates of Cook County Jail v. Tierney, No. 68 C. 504 (N.D. II. Aug. 22,
1968); Turner, Establishing the Rule of Law in Prisons: A Manual for Prisoner's
Rights Litigation, 1 BLACK LJ. 99, 100-102 (1971).
3 People v. Harmon, 53 Mich. App. 482, 220 N.W.2d 212 (1974). It should be noted
that the prosecution in this case has been given leave to appeal to the Supreme Court
of Michigan. People v. Harmon, appeal docketed No. 560-16 (Oct. 21, 1974).
4Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.193 (West 1967) (Michigan's escape statute).
5 53 Mich. App. at 485, 220 N.W.2d at 214. It appears that during the first two weeks
in prison, the defendant had requested to be transferred to the segregation ward due
to his fear of being "pressed for sex." This request was being denied, he remained at
the main facility until transferred to the dormitory system in June of 1972.
6 Id. Carl Sheppard, the inmate who entered the room during the defendant's initial
beating, testified at the trial and corroborated the defendant's story concerning the
assault and that it had ceased when Sheppard entered the room.
This corroboration proved very significant in the court's reversal of Harmon's
conviction for escape, for it verified in court his claim of his reasonable fear of
iminent or immediate harm. Id.
7This case came to the Michigan Court of Appeals on defendant's appeal from his
conviction before the County Circuit Court, Ionia County, for escaping from prison.
Mich. Comp. Laws, Ann. § 750.193 (West 1967). The defendant's main ground for
the appeal was the trial judge's refusal to submit his defense of "duress" to the jury.
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The court of appeals, in reversing the defendant's conviction for
escape, renounced prior law pertaining to the defense of duress, in terms
of fear of homosexual attacks, as a justification for prison escapes.8
The court's main ground for -the reversal appeared to stem from a
growing awareness of the problem of homosexual attacks in our prisons,9
and the individual prisoner's apparent inability to cope with such attacks.10
As a result of this awareness, the court felt that when corroborated
by independent evidence, alleged duress arising from a reasonable fear of
immediate injury from homosexual assault would constitute a valid defense
to the crime of escape."u In citing People v. Merhige,2 the Harmon court
agreed that in order to establish duress, the defendant must show that:
"... the violation of the law for which he stands charged was necessitated
by threatening conduct of another which resulted in defendant harboring a
reasonable fear of imminent or immediate death or serious bodily harm."13
Given the specific and immediate threats and assaults on the
defendant, and given the corroborating statements of another inmate,'14
the court reasoned that the facts were "more than sufficient to require"
submission of the duress defense to the jury. 5
The prosecution had argued that the case of People v. Noble'1 was
controlling on this area of the law, and that therefore defendant Harmon's
argument had no legal basis.
The Noble case, which also involved an escape due to alleged fear of
homosexual attacks, held that flight from prison for such fear was not
a defense to a charge of escape. The underlying reason for this view was
the Noble court's visualization of a "rash of escapes," all attempting
to be justified by "tales of sexual assault.' 17
8 See cases cited note 2 supra.
9 See note, The Problems of Modern Penology: Prison Life and Prisoners' Rights, 53
IA. L. REv. 671, 697-700 (1967). Estimates of the number of inmates who engage in
homosexual activities range as high as 80%. Id. at 698.
10 One of the main reasons for the prisoner's inability to cope with homosexual
attacks is the fear of further reprisals from other prisoners if it should be discovered
that the victim had reported such attacks to the prison authorities:
Administrative policy was not to investigate a complaint of physical abuse unless
the assailant was identified. But if an inmate "snitched"--turned in somebody's
name-his life wouldn't be worth a "plugged nickel"; he (the snitch) "was as
good as dead right then." State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 565, 569 (Mo. 1971)(Seiler, J., dissenting).
11 Prior to the court's decision in the Harmon case, alleged duress due to fear of
homosexual attack had not been recognized as a valid defense in a prosecution for
escape. See People v. Richards, 269 Cal. App. 2d 768, 770, 773, 774, 75 Cal. Rptr.
597, 599, 602 (1969).
1 212 Mich. 601, 180 N.W. 418 (1920).
13 53 Mich. App. at 486,220 N.W.2d at 214 (1974).
14 See note 6 supra.
15 53 Mich. App. at 486,220 N.W.2d at 214 (1974).
16 People v. Noble, 18 Mich. App. 300, 170 N.W.2d 916 (1969).
17 d. at 303, 170 N.W. at 918.
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. The court in Harmon rejected the prosecution's arguments based on
the Noble decision. The court reasoned that each such incident would be
judged on its own facts when the time arose, under the scrutiny of the
fact-finder. Hence, a mere claim of escape due to fear of homosexual
attack would not automatically suffice to prevent a conviction.'8 In answer
to the rash of escapes fear expressed in Noble,'9 the Harmon court
observed that their decision might "well produce a result entirely opposite"
to that fear.20 Therefore, in declining to follow Noble's refusal to allow
fear of homosexual attacks to be a valid defense for the charge of escape,
the Harmon court reasoned that if escape was presently the only remedy
available to prisoners in fear of homosexual attacks, then perhaps this
condition would prompt the prisons to make the improvements necessary
in order to better insure the personal safety of those inmates.2
As previously indicated, despite the fact that the problem of
homosexual assaults in prisons has long been an area of concern among
courts, prison officials and legal writers,22 prior to Harmon this fear had
not been viewed as a justifiable reason for escape from prison.23 The reasons
for this line of thinking have their roots in the "Hands-Off Doctrine"
traditionally followed by the courts.24 Generally, this doctrine stands for
the proposition that: ".... courts are without power to supervise prison
administrations or to interfere with ordinary prisori rules or regulations."
2
Though opinions over recent years have demonstrated a gradual
deviation from the past ardent support of the above doctrine,2 6 especially
in the area concerning recognition of prisoners' constitutional rights,27 the
courts have nevertheless been reluctant to depart from said doctrine when
it meant accusing prison officials of promoting brutal conditions or
18 50 Mich. App. at 487, 220 N.W.2d at 215. The court also observed: "It is not our
function in deciding this case to judge the veracity or claims of future prisoners who
might maintain that their escape was necessitated by such indignities.
19 See text accompanying note 17 supra.
20 53 Mich. App. at 487, 220 N.W.2d at 215 (1974).
21 Id.
22 See note 9 supra.
23 See Annot., 70 A.L.R.2d 1452 (Supp. 1974).
24 See generally Comment, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial
Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963).
25Id. at 506. See also People v. Merhige, 212 Mich. 601, 180 N.W. 418 (1920), for
various interpretations the courts have given to the "Hands-Off Doctrine." For a
personal view in reference to the "Hands-Off Doctrine," see SHAW, THE CRIME OF
IMPRISONMENT 14 (1946) wherein Shaw states:
Judges spend their lives consigning their fellow creatures to prison; and when
some whisper reaches them that prisons are horribly cruel and destructive
places, and that no creature fit to live should be sent there, they only remark
calmly that prisons are not meant to be comfortable; which is no doubt the
consideration that reconciled Pontius Pilate to the practice of crucifixion.
2 8See Comment, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to
Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963).
27 Id. at 507. See generally Comment: Constitutional Rights of Prisoners; The Devel-
oping Law, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 985 (1962).
[VOL 8:2
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permitting them to exist unabated in their prisons.2 The reason for the
prolonged reluctance stemmed from an earlier view of the courts that
prisoners were virtual slaves of the state, and essentially had no rights to
assert.Y However, over the years this rigid view slowly gave way, as seen
in Sewell v. Pegelow:30 "... it has never been held that upon entering a
prison one is entirely bereft of all his civil rights and forfeits every
protection of the law."
One of the areas which first received recognition was that of
improper imprisonment. The remedy invoked by the courts in such a case
was the writ of habeas corpus.32 However, this basic recognition soon
broadened to include an acknowledgment of prisoners' rights to live in
habitable conditions, to have freedom of religion, and to be free from
cruel and inhuman punishment.33 This latter reason became the focal
point in cases dealing with the brutality of prison life. However,
brutality and general complaints of bad food, "guard brutality" and the
like were, for the most part, unacceptable as justifications for escape. This
was the view taken by the court in State v. Palmer.34 The court's reasoning
centered around three public policy arguments, those being that prison
escapes are: (1) extremely disruptive of prison routine; (2) frequently
accompanied by serious injury to guards, police and the public, and (3)
if the remedy of prisoner "self-help" were to be allowed on the prisoner's
own evaluation of "intolerable conditions," the rash of probable escapes
would greatly increase.3 5
However, in rejecting general complaints of intolerable conditions, it
is significant to note that the Palmer court did seem to indicate that a
justification might be found upon a showing of a "grave and immediate
28 See Bethea v. Crouse, 417 F.2d 504, 505-06 (10th Cir. 1969):
We have consistently adhered to the so-called "hands-off" policy in matters of
prison administration according to which we have said that the basic responsi-
bility for the control and management of penal. institutions, including the
discipline, treatment and care of those confined, lies with the responsible
administrative agency and is not subject to judicial review unless exercised in a
manner as to constitute clear abuse or caprice upon the part of prison officials.
29See Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871): "He [the
convicted felon] has, as a consequence of his crime, not only forfeited his liberty, but
all his personal rights except those which the law in its humanity accords to him. He
is, for the time being, the slave of the state."
30 291 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961).
31Id. at 198. See also Bethea v. Crouse, 417 F.2d 504, 506 (10th cir. 1969); See
generally Dowd v. United States ex rel Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951); Comment, Consti-
tutional Rights of Prisoners; The Developing Law, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 985 (1962).
32See Comment, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to
Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506, 509 (1963).
33 Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969), supplemented by 309 F. Supp.
362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aft'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); see U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishment inflicted." (Emphasis added.)
34 45 DeL 308,310, 72 A.2d 442, 443 (1950).
3545 DeL at 310, 72 A.2d at 444.
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threat to life or health." 36 While this phrase has become a test for
justification of escape, it has also indirectly been the basis for the rejection
of the defense that fear of homosexual assault is such a justification. The
reason being, frankly, that homosexual attacks were not viewed by
the court or the public as such a "grave and immediate threat to life
or health as to constitute a valid defense of duress.
'37
Nevertheless, over the past decade the courts have begun a deeper
examination of the problem of homosexuality in our prisons. For
example, the federal case of Holt v. SarverA8 cited by the Harmon court,
recognized that the subjection of prisoners to such attacks constituted a
violation of their eighth amendment right of freedom from "cruel and
inhuman punishment." 39 In ordering the prison officials to take steps to
alleviate the problem, the court in Holt v. Sarver noted that: "Prisoners
are frequently attacked and raped in the dormitories and injuries and
deaths have resulted... [and that] no adequate means exist to protect the
prisoners from assaults."4o Therefore the court agreed with the finding of
the district court that when new funds do become available, first priority
is to be given to the "safety of the inmates of the barracks."'4
As a result, though Holt v. Sarver did not deal with the question of
homosexuality being a justification for escape," it did recognize it as a
severe problem to which a solution is of the utmost priority. Therefore, it
is somewhat surprising that when the courts did address themselves to the
issue of fear of homosexual attacks as being a justification for escape, they
refused to further the Holt v. Sarver type reasoning. For instance, in the
1969 case of People v. Richards," the California courts based their
affirmance of the defendant's conviction for escape on the grounds that
a showing of duress and/or coercion was lacking: 4
In order for duress or fear produced by threats or menace to be a
valid legal excuse for doing anything, which otherwise would be
criminal, the act must have been done under such threats or menaces
as show that the life of the person threatened or menaced was in
danger, or that there was reasonable cause to believe and actual
3845 Del. at 310, 72 A.2d at 443.
37 See text accompanying note 49 infra.
38 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969), supplemented by 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark.
1070), afl'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971). This case involved an action by prison
inmates for a declaratory judgment that acts, policies and practices in Arkansas
prisons violated their constitutional rights. One of the major complaints dealt with
the problem of homosexual attacks in their prison.
39 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
40 ld. at 308.
41 300 F. Supp. at 834.
4 2 See note 38 supra.
43 269 Cal. App. 2d 768, 75 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1969).
44 Id. at 773-74, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
[Vol 8:2
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belief that there was such danger.., the danger must be... of
present and immediate violence. 4
The Richards court, relying heavily on the case of People v.
Whipple,46 seemed to place a fear of "destruction of general discipline" in
the prison as paramount to prisoner fear of violence from third persons.47
All in all, the court rejected Richards' contention of his "necessity" to
escape. Given the situation of his case, and that he wasn't being pursued
by his tormentors at the time he effectuated his escape, they reasoned
that he should have resorted to the traditional remedies of relief "through
established administrative channels, or, that failing, through the courts." 48
The court in Richards did not feel duress was applicable where only
homosexual attack was feared, stating: "The submission to sodomy,
abhorrent as it may be, falls short of loss of life." 49
Richards was not alone in its refusal to recognize fear of homosexual
attack as duress. In 1971, the Missouri Supreme Court in State v. Green °
followed Richards when it sustained the conviction for escape of a
19-year-old defendant. The similarity of Green's fact pattern to that of
Harmon accentuates the abrupt about-face the latter court took.51
However, Judge Seiler's dissent in the Green case offered a persuasive
rejoinder to the majority's conclusion that the duress and necessity
defenses were not available to defendant Green, since the threat of death
was not shown to be immediate. In a descriptive account of the
defendant's experiences, Judge Seiler attempted to show the immediacy of
the threat to the defendant, a threat which was in no way abated by the
45 Id. citing People v. Sanders, 82 Cal. App. 778, 785, 256 P. 251, 254 (1927). In
Richards, the court held there was no showing of duress despite defendant's testimony
and further corroboration of same by fellow inmate Joel Blume. The latter testified to
the fact that Richards had been threatened with death because he had "snitched"
to authorities about his having been forced to submit to homosexual attacks: "I[Blume] was told that I had best stay away from him because there was a couple of
knives waiting to be stuck in him and if I was around him at the time I would be
stuck also." 269 Cal. App. 2d at 771, n.4, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 600 n.4.
46 100 Cal. App. 261, 263-64, 279 P. 1008, 1009 (1929): "... neither the unsanitary
condition of the jail ... fear of violence from third persons.., nor unmerited punish-
ment at the hands of the custodian... will present a situation which in law may be
accepted as an excuse for violation of the [escape] statute."
47269 Cal. App. 768,777-78,75 Cal. Rptr. 597, 604 (1969).
48 ld.
49 269 Cal. App. at 774, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 602; see also note 45 supra.
50 470 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. 1971) (en banc).
5 ld. at 569-70 (Seller, J., dissenting):
during the night, two inmates, one white, one black, picked the lock ofdefendant's cell door. At knife-point, defendant was homosexually ravaged byboth inmates. Two weeks later, three inmates, black and white, invadeddefendant's cell, knocked him unconscious as he tried to flee, and raped him.
. .. [a few months later], defendant returned to his cell during the lunch break.Four or five black inmates gathered around his cell.... They told him they
would return that evening to make him a "punk" [a person who plays a female
role in homosexual incidents] for the remainder of his time in prison. Theseinmates threatened to "beat his head i" or kill the defendant if he would not
submit.
Winter, 1975]
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responses of prison officials to Green's requests for protection. 52 The
dissent in concluding made note of an apparent inconsistency in
the majority's holding:
... if the defendant here had been prosecuted for sodomy as a result
of the first assault, it would seem clear that a defense of coercion
would be available. In this case defendant sought to avoid committing
the coerced act by resorting to escape. Because he was a prisoner,
this action was a crime. The act of escape was just as much coerced
as the prior act of sodomy. It is consistent with the principle
underlying the defense to allow it to be asserted here.53
CONCLUSION: IMPACT AND CRITICISM
As can be deduced from the preceding text, the Harmon decision
stands alone in its recognition of fear of homosexual attacks being a
valid defense of duress in prosecutions for escape from prison. What now
remains is whether courts in other jurisdictions will choose to follow the
Harmon lead. It is this author's opinion that most courts will do so. The
problem of homosexuality in prison has become overwhelmingly apparent
to the courts in the past few years. Through legal writers and public
opinion, this problem has been repeatedly laid before the tribunals and
legislatures in an effort to invoke some sort of positive response and
solution to the problem.54 However, until the Harmon court took the first
step, no other court had been willing to depart from the established law
on the subject, that no matter how severe, such exposure to homosexual
abuse was not viewed as a valid justification for the crime of escape
from prison. 55 Because of this, even though the courts may have personally
felt otherwise, they would not re-write the law to permit such -fear to
qualify as a justification.
The dilemma which faced the courts surfaced in the case of People
v. Whipple,56 where the court frankly stated its problem:
It is with very great reluctance that we admit that, under practically
all of the authorities, the foregoing opinion states the established law
... the function of the court is to declare the law as it is, and we are
52 The dissent noted that following each of the alleged assaults the defendant had
feigned injury in order to contact the prison authorities. However, when he requested
protection from the Assistant Superintendent of Treatment at the hospital, he was
simply told to defend himself. After the second assault the defendant reported to the
Disciplinary Board about the assaults, at which time the Assistant Superintendent of
Custody told the defendant to either "defend himself, submit, or go over the wall."
470 S.W.2d at 570. See also State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 565, 569, n.1 (Mo. 1971)
(Seiler, J., dissenting), regarding the investigation of sexual assaults in the Phila-
delphia prison system.
53470 S.W.2d at 571.
54 See, e.g., Karabian, California's Prison System: We Must Bring It into the Twentieth
Century, 1 BLAcK L.J. 145, 150 n.15 (1971).
55See Annot., 70 A.L.R.2d 1452 (Supp. 1974).
5100 Cal. App. 261,279 P 1008 (1929).
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not authorized to usurp the place of the legislature, which has the
power to make laws, and the duty to make just law.57
However, now that there exists precedent allowing the defense of
duress to be asserted and submitted to the jury, other courts will have the
opportunity to do so. Whether they do or not remains to be seen. But
given present court attitudes on the subject of homosexuality, coupled
with public recognition of the problem, this author feels it is more than
likely that other jurisdictions will also begin to recognize the defense of
duress in cases where the duress asserted is readily apparent.
It is the further belief of this author that such a viewpoint is a long
time coming. Further, it may, as suggested in Harmon,5 8 spark prison
officials into working toward viable safeguards against homosexual
problems. Though money is often the main obstacle, 59 a non-monetary
step toward a solution lies in prison officials' empathy with the prisoner's
dilemma, and offerance of a better response to the complaining prisoner
than "defend yourself, submit, or go over the wall." 60
Though many courts may still feel the Harmon solution will open the
door to a "rash of escapes" 6 1 and a resulting "disruption of the general
prison discipline, ' 62 the basic fact remains that prisoners are not slaves
and deserve to be accorded their basic constitutional rights.63 For, if we
are ever to begin the actual "rehabilitation" of prisoners, we must find an
alternative to our program of perpetual prisoner debasement-a program
which only results in priming whatever criminal instinct the prisoner may
harbor within. We must begin by putting a stop to the policy of playing
"fast and loose with [their] basic constitutional rights in the interest of
administrative efficiency, ' 64 and begin to realize that perhaps by recogniz-
ing prisoners' rights, and thus building their self-respect, we are also
laying the foundation for their eventual rehabilitation and return to
society-a result which, for the most part, is nonexistent today.65
RicHARD S. BERGER
57 Id. at 265-66, 279 P. at 1010; see also notes 24 and 25, supra, regarding the "Hands-
Off Doctrine."
58 53 Mich. App. at 487-88, 220 N.W.2d at 215.
59 See text accompanying note 41 supra.
60 See note 52 supra, and accompanying text.
61 See note 17 supra, and accompanying text.
62 See note 47 supra.
6 3 See note 31, supra, and accompanying text; see also Bethea v. Crouse, 417 F.2d 504,
506 (10th Cir. 1969).
64 United States ex rel Marcial v. Fay, 247 F.2d 662, 669 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 915 (1952).
65 See DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, DIVISION OF RESEARCH: A STATISTICAL DESCRIP-
TION OF RcmsTs. REPORT 11, 70 (Huntsville, Tex., 1972) (this report noted that
33.8% of the total prison population in the Texas Department of Corrections were
recidivists). See also P. HERSEY & K. BLANCHARD, MANAGEMENT OF ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHA oR: UTELiznbo HUMAN REsouRCEs 40-42 (1969), for a discussion of the
"Theory X" theory of personnel management, and its demise due to being an
improper means of motivating workers.
Winter, 1975)
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